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In general, F. P. Ramsey’s view on truth is said to have a deflationist tendency. But 
there can hardly be said to be consensus on (1) in what sense his view deflates the 
conception of truth, (2) what implications this kind of view has in the context of his 
whole philosophy, especially with regards to his theory of belief and judgement. 
This paper concerns these questions, arguing as follows, that in regard to the first 
question, what Ramsey says about truth, while surely leaving no room for accepting 
ontological or epistemological characterizations of the concept and thus having to be 
read as a sort of deflationism, is to be understood, not as the strong “redundancy” theory 
normally attributed to him, but rather as a moderate version of deflationism, similar to 
Horwich’s minimalism or Field’s deflationary theory. That is to say, Ramsey is not one of 
those who asserts that truth-predicate itself has no meaning and truth is not a property, 
but who indeed admits that truth is a property, a syntactic or ‘logical’ property. And, 
with regard to the second question, the relation between his pragmatic theory of 
judgement or belief and his deflationary theory of truth supports this kind of moderate 
interpretation. Moreover, the paper argues that today’s “success semantics” is, though 
often attributed to Ramsey, not intended by himself. 
 
 
 
 
